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 1 
Introduction 
Liberal theories of democracy share the view that political participation and deliberation is 
important because it contributes to the construction of a strong demos through the 
institutionalization of a tight public control with the authorities (Bentham, 1776/1948; Mill, 
1820/1937; Dahl, 1989) and/or a strong sense of communality among the citizens that constitutes 
them as a People (Stuart Mill, 1861/1946; Barber, 1984; Macpherson, 1977; Pateman, 1970). 
However, liberal theories of democracy have neglected to consider the possible role of participation 
and deliberation in enhancing democratic control and a sense of communality interaction between 
demoi. This neglect is becoming still more evident due to the current changes in the way advanced 
liberal democracies are governed. The age of nation state hegemony that has for the last 250 years 
been the imaginary point of departure for liberal theories of democracy is over and we are 
approaching an age of pluricentrism  (Kersbergen and Waarden, 2004) in which processes of 
societal governance more often than not involves more than one demos. This transition from nation 
state hegemony to pluricentric governance calls for the development of new theories of democracy, 
which seek answers to the question of how inter-demoi governance can be democratically regulated.     
In recent years, much attention has been given to the role that networks play and might play in the 
provision of efficient and effective inter-organizational governance (Kickert, Klijn and Koppenjan, 
1997; Rhodes, 1997; Jessop, 1998; Goldsmith and Eggers, 2002; Kettl, 2002; Sørensen and Torfing, 
2007). Less attention has been directed towards the problems and potentials of networks as a means 
to enhance democratic governance. The aim of this article is to discuss and analyze to what extent 
and how governance networks can function as a means to facilitate democratic inter-demoi 
participation and deliberation. The first step in this endeavor is to show how liberal theories of 
democracy have tended to focus on intra-demos participation and deliberation, while giving limited 
attention to the democratic quality of the interplay between demoi. Then, follow a description of the 
surging age of pluricentric governance in which advanced liberal democracies are turning into 
pluricentric political systems of governance, where governance networks play a central role as a 
medium for vertical and horizontal coordination between multiple units of governance. Next step is 
to consider the democratic implications of this transition from nation state hegemony to pluricentric 
governance from the perspective of traditional liberal theories of democracy. Finally, I point to how 
governance networks, seen from the perspective of a new emerging body of theories of democracy 
can contribute to not merely rescuing but actually enhancing democracy in the age of pluricentric 
governance by providing a framework for democratic participation and deliberation between demoi.  
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Participation and deliberation in liberal theories of democracy 
Liberal theories of democracy, that is theories which seek to deal with the tension between 
collective decision making and individual liberty (Holden, 1993: 23ff; Heywood, 2002: 30), can be 
divided into two groups: protective and developmental theories of democracy (Heywood. 2002: 73-
6; Held, 1987:  Ch. 2 & 3). Both groups of theory underline the importance of participation and 
deliberation for democracy.  
Turning first to the protective theories of democracy, they regard participation and deliberation as 
crucial for the protection of the citizens vis-a-vis the state (Mill, 1820/1937: 45; Bentham, 
1776/1948: 143; Dahl, 1989: 113). Citizen participation in general elections is vital because it 
grants the citizens a means to control the sovereign ruler i.e. the government through the election of 
representatives. Deliberation is equally important because it enhances the ability of the citizens to 
make informed choices at Election Day. Hence, ongoing public debate played out in a free public 
space provides citizens with relevant knowledge and information about the issues at stake, and an 
opportunity to test and qualify their view points in dialogue with other citizens and elected 
representatives. The underlying point of reference in this protective approach to participation and 
deliberation is that democratic control exclusively concerns the relationship between a specific 
group of citizens and their elected representatives within a given predefined territorially demarcated 
demos i.e. the state.  
Within protective theories of democracy the liberal tension between collective decision making and 
individual liberty appears as a dilemma between ‘government by the people’ and ‘government for 
the people’. In other words: should priority be given to strong citizen control with the government 
or to enhancing the ability of this government to govern efficiently and effectively for the benefit of 
the people? There is so to speak believed to be an inherent trade-off between democracy and 
efficiency that cannot be absolved. This trade-off is more outspoken in some policy areas than in 
others, and most of all in foreign policy, due to the central role of inter-demoi interaction between 
governments (Connolly, 1995: 141). Foreign policy, where the liberal state performs one of its most 
central objectives, namely that of protecting the citizens against outside dangers and enemies, is 
said to be in high need of confidentiality in order to be efficient. The price that must be paid for this 
confidentiality is a restriction of the citizens’ ability to control their representatives through their 
access to full information and a free public debate. As such protective theories of democracy tend to 
give up the call for tight control with governance processes that involve inter-demoi interaction.    
Developmental theories of democracy give different reasons for the importance of public 
participation and deliberation. Participation and deliberation is first and foremost considered as 
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necessary in order to transform the citizens from self-interested individuals into democratic citizens 
who regard themselves as part of a people with common interests and a shared understanding 
(Stuart Mill, 1861/1946:  254; Tocqueville, 1835/1968: 25; Almond & Verba, 1963: 88-9; Pateman, 
1970: 105). Democratic citizens do not merely pursue individual goals but seek to promote the 
common good of the specific demos to which they belong. The sense of communality and shared 
identity that constitutes a strong unitary demos is brought about through the existence of a well 
functioning civil society that allows for extensive citizen participation and public deliberation. 
Widespread citizen participation helps to visualize the interrelatedness between individual and 
collective interests while ongoing deliberation among the citizens enhances the creation of shared 
understanding and belonging. As such a well functioning participatory civil society is seen as the 
corner stone of democracy. 
In developmental theories of democracy the tension between collective decision making and 
individual liberty surface as an insurmountable tension between democratic inclusion and exclusion. 
Hence, the claim for communality sentiments as a constituting feature of a demos tends to produce 
sharp patterns of internal and external exclusion. One the one the production of a strong sense of 
communality calls for deep inclusion through extensive participation and deliberation. On the other 
hand, efforts to establish a strong unitary people rely on the construction of a constitutive outside to 
that unity that produces antagonistic sentiments between the included and the excluded.  
Internally, the constitutive outside is represented by those individuals who have not yet developed 
into democratic citizens, capable and willing to pursue the common good of the larger community. 
These individuals should be given access to participate and deliberate in civil society in order to 
promote their transformation from self-interested individuals into democratic citizens, but they 
should not be given influence until this transformation has taken place. John Stuart Mill’s famous 
propositions of a system of plural voting and a democratic divide between a national level of 
competent democratic decision making and a local training ground for citizen participation and 
deliberation, illustrates this way of thinking, and the resulting search for ways to disconnect 
participation and influence (Stuart Mill, 1861/1946: Ch. 6; Macpherson, 1977: 50ff). As such, the 
paradoxical outcome of the democratic desire for a homogenous civil society that produces a strong 
communality within a given demos is the construction of a sharp line of demarcation between the 
included and the excluded: 1) between those who count as fully developed democratic citizens and 
those who do not, and 2) between that which has been canonized as being in the interest of the 
common good and that which has not.  
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Externally, the constituting outside is represented by all those who do not belong to a specific 
people: those who can be said to belong to other demoi and those who fall in between demoi. By 
focusing exclusively on the common good of the members of a specific demos, efforts to pursue the 
identification of a common good that reaches beyond that demos is democratically 
incomprehensible and irrelevant.  Efforts to promote collective thinking, shared understanding and a 
sense of communality through participation and deliberation stops at the borders of the homogenous 
civil society i.e. the nation state, and political issues that transgress the borders of this nation state, 
cannot and should not be regulated democratically. 
 
It should now be clear, that both protective and developmental theories of democracy, perceive 
democracy as a way of regulating decision-making within the confines of a sovereign unitary nation 
state.  
There is no reason to believe that the sovereign nation state imaginary that underpins these liberal 
theories of democracy has ever mirrored reality. The distance between image and reality is evident 
in federal democracies where the difficulties of theoretically conceptualizing the relationship 
between the federal government and the states have been persistent (Dahl. 1986: 114), but the 
sovereignty of unitary states has also to a smaller or larger extend been jeopardized in praxis by 
their need to gain support from other powerful external and internal societal actors.  
However, the massive transformation of the institutional set up of advanced liberal democracies that 
has taken place in the last decades has deepened the distance between imaginary and reality to a 
degree that makes references to a unitary sovereign nation state more and more of an anachronism. 
The persistent survival of the imaginary of a sovereign nation state as point of departure in debates 
on how policy making is and should be performed is in Bill Connolly’s (1995: 317) phrasing to be 
understood as some sort of ‘politics of homesickness’, that we clings to in order to maintain the safe 
perception of politics as an orderly and controlled process that is played out within the confines of a 
given territory conceptualized as community, nation, or people. This politics of homesickness 
hampers our recognition of the considerable impact that the emergence of a pluricentric political 
system has on the contemporary functioning of democracy, and thus of the pressing need for a 
theoretical as well as an institutional renewal of democracy.   
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Towards pluricentrism  
Then, what kind of political system is developing in the wake of the withering of the sovereign 
nation state? Despite considerable differences between them political scientists, and governance 
theorists in particular tend to agree that the political systems within advanced liberal democracies 
are getting more and more pluricentric (Rhodes, 1997; Kickert, Klijn & Koppenjan, 1997; 
Goldsmith & Eggers, 2002; Ansell, 2000; Kettle, 2002; Kersbergen & Waarden, 2004; Pierre & 
Peters, 2005; Skelcher, 2005; Sørensen & Torfing, 2007). The increased pluricentrism is seen as a 
result of four changes:  
Political globalization has led to the establishment and consolidation of a multiplicity of 
transnational political institutions and public and private organizations that push for the 
establishment of a set of transnational standards for how nation states can act internally and 
externally, and which monitor transnational policy making and policy implementation (Greven & 
Pauly, 2000; Bache & Flinders 2004; Larner & Walters, 2004; Van Heffen, Kickert & Thomassen, 
2000). 
De-bureaucratization of the administrative apparatus through the implementation of New Public 
Management (NPM) reforms that split the state apparatus into fragmented and decentred units of 
public governance (Hirst, 1994: 7; Rhodes, 2000: 345f; Pollitt & Bouckaert, 2004: 175; Bogason, 
2004: 27 f). 
Transformation of private actors such as firms and voluntary organizations into co-producers of 
public governance through various forms of formal and informal partnership arrangements 
(Kooiman, 1993: 4; Mathur, Skelcher & Smith, 2004: 2:  Milward & Provan, 1993:  222ff; Kettl, 
2002: 119).    
Growth in governance networks that enhance coordination between decentred producers of public 
governance, and between public and private stakeholders in different policy areas and at different 
levels of governance (Kooiman, 1993: 4; Kickert, Klijn & Koppenjan, 1997: 7ff; Rhodes, 1997: 51; 
Milward & Provan, 2001: 241; Goldsmith & Eggers, 2002: 9ff; Ansell, 2000: 305).    
The added outcome of the radical changes described above is a distortion of the internal and 
external sovereignty and unity of the nation state (Onuf, 1991: 432; Hinsley, 1986: 100). Political 
globalization jeopardizes the external sovereignty of the state vis-à-vis other sovereign rulers, while 
the fragmentation and decentring of governance competencies to various relatively self-regulating 
public and private actors decentre and diffuse the internal sovereignty of the state. Finally, the 
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formation of governance networks blurs the borderlines between different policy compartments and 
different levels in the political system.  
As such, public governance can no longer be seen as the outcome of a system of state rule. Rather, 
it represents the outcome of complex patchwork-like process of piecemeal decision making that 
takes place within the confines of a pluricentric political system in which different centers of power 
within and beyond the state apparatus seeks to govern society in close cooperation and competition 
with other powerful public and private actors.  
While most governance theorists agree on a more or less radical version of this diagnosis, debates 
concerning the impact that this transition of the political system has on the powers of the state has 
been harsh. Some argue that the state is a strong as ever (Hirst & Thompson, 1996; Kernsberger, 
Lieshout & Verbeek, 2000), while others contend that the powers of the state have been reduced 
considerably (Milward & Provan, 1993). However, a large group of governance theorists, and I with 
them, argue that the external and internal sovereignty of the state has indeed been reduced, but that 
this has not led to a weakening of the powers of the state as such (Mayntz, 2003: 32; Kooiman, 
2003: 79; Jessop, 2004: 57; Ansell, 2000: 310). I shall argue, that the transition from sovereign rule 
to pluricentric governance can in fact be seen as a part of a new governmentality that paves the way 
for an extension of the realm of public governance into the trans-national realm and into the 
private realms of the market and civil society, which were formerly beyond the reach of liberal 
governments.   
What we witness is a general governmentalization of society according to which all corners of 
social life are being made subject to public governance (Dean, 1999: 6). However, this 
governmentalization of society goes hand in hand with a governmentalization of government itself 
that calls upon the state to govern in different ways (Dean, 1999: 21, 193). Sovereign forms of rule 
must be given up in order to strengthen the ability of the state to govern society through forms of 
governance that are played out through the design of governance processes and political identities 
that invoke societal actors to govern themselves and others. In sum, the state has lost its sovereign 
position, but at the same time it has developed new and not less ambitious ways of governing 
society through the regulation of freedoms (Rose, 1999: 65), or as governance theorists call it 
through meta-governance (Jessop, 2003; Kooiman, 2003; Sørensen & Torfing, 2006: chapter 9). 
The pluricentric political system is an outcome of this endeavor to enhance the meta-governing 
capacity of the state.   
 In sum, the age of pluricentric governance has undermined the sovereign position of the state vis-á-
vis other centers of political decision making, just as it has transformed the state itself from being a 
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unitary whole into being a fragmented and decentred patchwork of overlapping arenas of public-
private co-governance. In this pluricentric political system, coordination is not primarily achieved 
through formal law and bureaucratic rule and regulation within the limits of a coherent clearly 
demarcated unit of governance, but through metagovernance and different forms of self-regulation 
within a complex, dynamic and heterogeneous plurality of relatively autonomous and mutually 
overlapping units of public governance within and beyond the boundaries of the nation state.   
  
Pluricentrism as a challenge to liberal democracy  
Pluricentrism challenges liberal perceptions of democracy in at least two ways: 1) it undermines the 
channels of democratic control with elected political leaders that are so central to protective theories 
of democracy, and 2) it distorts the formation of a unitary homogenous civil society with a shared 
identity and a clear image of its constituting outside that developmental theories of democracy 
regard as the constituting feature of democracy.  
The democratic control problem springs from the fact that governance no longer takes place within 
a unified political system in which a clearly demarcated body of citizens controls a group of 
representatives through their informed and qualified participation in general elections that takes 
place on the basis of free public deliberation. This democratic control model is first of all 
undermined by the fact that current processes of governance more often than not involve more than 
one nation state. Inter-state governance is no longer a specific feature of foreign policy but has 
become an important and increasingly institutionalized ingredient in most areas of public policy 
making. The fact that these inter-state activities are only to a limited extent controlled by elected 
politicians and made subject to public deliberation does not necessarily represent a problem for 
democracy if they, like foreign policy, are seen as a necessary means to provide efficient and 
effective governance for the people. Seen from a protective approach to democracy this reduced 
control could be seen as a necessary and insignificant rebalancing of the insurmountable tension 
between democracy by the people and democracy for the people. More problematic is the distortion 
of the protective control mechanisms that takes place when the citizens of many national demoi, 
like in the EU, have been given the opportunity to elect a trans-national body of representatives. 
This trans-nationalization of representative democracy is perceived as a serious threat to protective 
democracy because it undermines the one-to-one relationship between the people and its’ 
representatives that is a corner stone in the maintenance of democratic control. Hence, the 
establishment of a cross-demoi body of elected representatives, like the EU-parliament, paves the 
way for a situation in which citizens from one demos are ruled by a majority of representatives 
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elected by citizens from other demoi. This problematic has resulted in a heated debate about the 
degree to which democratic thought is in fact at all compatible with trans-national institutions 
(Scharpf, 2001; Greven 2000; Newman, 2000; Schmitter, 2000; Dahl, 1999). As such the control 
perspective advanced by protective theories of democracy leads to two mutually exclusive reactions 
to political globalization: 1) an acceptance of an intensified and more institutionalized foreign 
policy, which is only to a limited degree controlled through public participation and deliberation, or 
2) a claim for the establishment of a cosmopolitan democracy (Held, 1995; Habermas, 2001; 
Bohman, 2005) in which the protective relationship between a clearly demarcated citizenry and a 
sovereign body of elected representatives is upgraded to a global level.  
Another challenge from pluricentrism to the provision of democratic control, as suggested by 
protective theories of democracy, has to do with the still more decentred and fragmented scope of 
the state apparatus, which is among other things caused by the New Public Management (NPM) 
reform programme that has put its mark on most advanced liberal democracies from the 1980s and 
up till today (Pollitt &Bouckaert, 2004). The aim of this programme has been to increase the 
efficiency and effectiveness of public governance by exchanging legal, bureaucratic forms of 
government with a market based model of decentred public administration and competitive service 
provision among public and private providers of public services (Hood, 1991, 1996; Sørensen, 
2007). This new model of public governance establishes a divide between the responsibility of 
elected representatives and the responsibility of public service providers, which is not immediately 
comprehensible for the citizens. It becomes still more difficult for citizens to establish a clear 
connection between decisions made by elected representatives and the experienced performance 
providers of public services. This decoupling of political leadership and public service delivery is 
recognized and encouraged by the NPM-reform programme, which calls upon dissatisfied citizens 
to blame – not the elected representatives - but the service providers, and sanction them and not the 
politicians by ‘exiting’ as would a costumer on a market (Hirschman, 1970). What takes place here 
is a down-grading of the level of citizen control with the public sector through democratically 
elected representation in favor of a market based system of sanctioning. Seen from a protective 
perspective on democracy this way of ensuring democratic control is not only problematic because 
it undermines the sovereign control of the elected representatives with substantial parts of public 
governance, but also because the exit-based market oriented control system is not accompanied by 
‘voice’ mechanisms (Hirschman, 1970: 30), which ensure that citizens are able to make informed 
and well reflected choices qualified through public participation and deliberation (Sørensen, 1997).  
Yet, another control problem related to pluricentrism has to do with the establishment of all sorts of 
public-private partnerships. Such partnerships between public authorities and voluntary 
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organizations and business firms are problematic because it is difficult for citizens as well as for 
elected politicians to control private actors through participation and deliberation. It is not possible 
to democratically sanction private actors at Election Day, just as the legalized claim for 
transparency and openness in processes of public decision making tend to be weaker when private 
actors are involved.  
Finally, the complex web of governance networks that emerge in the effort to enhance vertical and 
horizontal coordination within the decentred and fragmented political system are problematic seen 
form the perspective of protective theories of democracy because their informal and dynamic 
character makes them difficult to control. Hence, inter-organizational governance networks between 
public and private actors and between local, national and transnational public authorities tend to de-
couple the bureaucratic and legal strings of control through which elected politicians seek to 
maintain sovereign control over the governance process, and the informality and opaqueness of 
network interaction reduces the ability of the citizenry to control them by making their actions 
subject to public deliberation.    
In sum, the erosion of the unitary sovereign state caused by the NPM-reform programme, the 
formation of public-private partnerships, and the surge of inter-organizational governance networks, 
has severe implications for the exercise of democratic control as defined by the protective theories 
of democracy. Seen from this perspective the democratic control problem can only be remedied in 
one out of two ways: 1) through a re-institutionalization of the sovereign state and the patterns of 
participation and deliberation that is installed through the institutions of representative democracy, 
or 2) through the development of a tight system of metagovernance that ensures elected politicians 
an indirect control with the many actors that contribute to the production of public governance 
through the measurement of policy outcomes. This strengthening of democracy for the people at the 
cost of democracy by the people is the core ingredient in the NPM reform program (Sørensen, 
2007).  
It is now time to take a look at how the emergence of a pluricentric political system jeopardizes the 
promotion of a sense of communality so cherished by developmental theories of liberal democracy. 
First, political globalization tends to blur the borderlines that demarcate the external patterns of 
inclusion and exclusion between a given demos and its constituting outside. It simply raises doubts 
about the scope of the demos: its boundaries, its identity, and its homogeneity. Trans-national 
political institutions such as the EU and the UN tend to rank both the human rights of individuals 
and the common good of the globe higher than the well being of the individual nation state. By 
doing so, they raise doubts as to the political legitimacy of focusing on the common good of 
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individual nation states, just as they promote the production of transnational points of political 
identification. The result is a destabilization of the image of the nation state as an undivided 
naturally given political unity that has the legitimate right to pursue its national interests to the 
benefit of its citizens. As such, the presence of trans-national political institutions increase the 
inherent tension already present within developmental theories of democracy between the call for 
extensive participation and deliberation among all citizens, and the harsh exclusion of non-citizens, 
by illuminating the contingent and hence political character of the external patterns of exclusion.  
 The image of democracy as something that is played out within the confines of a unitary political 
community is also threatened from within due to the internal decentring and fragmentation of the 
state apparatus. This internal transformation of the public sector has undermined the image of the 
nation as one large unitary and undivided national community held together by a strong sense of 
shared communality and identity. The image is eroded by the emergence of a plurality of partial 
territorially and functionally demarcated and mutually overlapping publics (Habermas, 1989, 1992; 
Fraser, 1992) with complex, unclear and relatively unstable points of identification. The 
consequential weakening of the internal unity within the national demoi leads to a de-legitimization 
of internal exclusions of those who cannot and/or will not attest to what has gained hegemony as the 
common good. The division of the public into many publics with different views on the nature of 
the common good and with different points of identification and notions of communality 
destabilizes the very idea, that a unitary communality is a precondition for a well functioning 
democracy. The presence of many publics or communities with different notions of the common 
good visualizes that the internally excluded are excluded on contingent grounds because they do not 
fit the prevailing image of what it means to be a good democratic citizen at a given point in time. As 
such, it is visualized that exclusions are political in nature and should thus be made subject to 
democratic regulation.     
The propensity to establish clear internal lines of demarcation between the included and the 
excluded in developmental theories of democracy, is further challenged by the increased 
involvement of private actors in the production of public governance. This involvement disrupts the 
image of the demos as consisting of citizens and not of organized interests and private businesses 
which are regarded as outside the realm of democratic decision making. Hence, private actors are 
seen as carriers of particular interests, wherefore their participation in processes of public 
governance is expected to hamper efforts to identify a common good. For that reason, only citizens 
should be included in processes of public governance.   
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In sum, the emergence of a pluricentric political system destabilizes the external and internal 
patterns of exclusion that are central to developmental theories of democracy by making it difficult 
to develop a stable and unitary sense of communality among a demarcated group of citizens. 
Polycentrism promotes an unstable scenario of shifting and overlapping territorially and 
functionally anchored points of collective identification, which constantly calls for the construction 
and justification of new temporal demoi and related patterns of external and internal inclusion and 
exclusion.         
 
Governance network as a medium for inter-demoi democracy 
It should now be clear that the surge of a pluricentric political system challenges traditional liberal 
perceptions of democracy by undermining the unitary, sovereign nation state: it distorts the unitary 
chain of democratic control installed through the institutions of representative democracy and 
destabilizes the production of one over aching national sense of communality.  
Seen from this perspective, the future of democracy appears to be gloomy. However, I shall argue 
that the prospects for democracy are not necessarily that bleak. Measured from the viewpoint of a 
wave of new theories of democracy, the future of democracy depends on its ability to adapt to new 
circumstances (Hurley, 1999: 276; Benz & Papadopoulos, 2006: 4; Bohman, 2005: 293). These 
theories do not attempt to identify one true universal and perfect model of democracy that will fit all 
societies at all times. Instead they take a more modest and pragmatic and innovative stand by 
claiming that the aim must be to find ways in which to make the best of democracy at this particular 
time and space in history. The need to be modest and pragmatic is among others stressed by James 
Bohman when he suggests that the aim of democratic theory must be to focus on democratization 
i.e. moving in the right direction in stead of reaching for the stars (Bohman, 2005) while Mark 
Saward points to the inherent innovative character of democracy that calls for a constant conceptual 
and institutional renewal of democracy: ‘The story of democracy is nothing if not a story of 
innovation. One of the defining features of democracy may well be its restlessness, dynamism and 
comparative openness to new ideas’ (Saward, 2000: 3).  As such the future of democracy rests on 
our ability to creatively adjust and redefine the conceptual and institutional features of democracy in 
order to increase its ability to function in a changing world.  
One of the core challenges that face democracy in the age of pluricentrism is the extensive amount 
of governance that involves more than one demos. This state of affairs increases the pressure for 
finding ways to democratically regulate inter-demoi governance. If this task is fulfilled successfully 
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there is not only a solid chance that democracy will survive pluricentrism - chances are, that 
democracy will prosper from it. First, the search for ways to promote the democratic quality of 
inter-demoi interaction might in fact lead to the development of new patterns of participation and 
deliberation that will help to strengthen intra-demos interaction between elected leaders and the 
citizens. As argued by a number of scholars (Stoker, 2006; Pitkin, 2004; Barber, 1984; Hirst, 2000) 
institutions of representative democracy have not in practice been able to fulfill the promise made 
by traditional theories of liberal democracy that is to establish close links of control and 
identification between elected representatives and the citizen. By restricting the interaction between 
decision makers and citizens to participation in general elections and an unspecified public 
deliberation the links of control and identification have in fact become very ‘thin’. Various 
supplementary forms of territorially and functionally organized participation and deliberation that 
promote an ongoing and intensive interaction between decision makers and citizens might in fact 
help to strengthen national representative democracy. The introduction of such supplementary 
forms of participation and deliberation will indeed make democracy complex and messy compared 
to the simplistic and unitary institutions of representative democracy, but the gain is likely to be a 
much needed improvement of the quality of democracy.  
Second, the search for ways to democratically regulate inter-demoi governance initiates a just as 
needed expansion of the realm of democracy. By viewing democracy as an intra-demos 
phenomenon that has to do with the establishment of links of control and communality between 
elected representatives and citizens, traditional theories of democracy deemed important parts of the 
governance process beyond the realm of democratic regulation This leaves governance processes 
that take place at the trans-national level, involve private actors, and deals with the implementation 
of public policy beyond the reach of democratic regulation. As such, the mere extension of the 
focus of democracy so as to include inter-demoi governance paves the way for a strengthening of 
democracy. However, in order to fulfill this promise of more democracy we need to find ways to 
promote inter-demoi control and communality through different forms of cross-demoi participation 
and deliberation.  
The search for new forms of inter-demoi participation and deliberation must go down many avenues 
in order to cover as much ground as possible. In this paper, however, I restrict my focus to the 
possible role of governance networks in this endeavor. While the surge of governance networks is 
in fact a part of the pluricentric challenge to democracy it also provides an important part of the 
solution. Hence, governance networks provide a forum for vertical and horizontal coordination, 
cooperation and communication that has the potential to promote inter-demoi control and 
identification.  
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Then, what do I mean by governance networks? Summarizing the definition of governance 
networks posed by the extensive literature on the subject, governance networks can be defined as 1) 
relatively stable articulations of interdependent, but operationally autonomous actors, who 2) 
interact with one another through negotiations, which 3) take place within a regulative, normative, 
cognitive and imaginary framework, that is 4) self-regulating within limits set by external forces, 
and which 5) contributes to the production of public purpose (Torfing, 2005).   
Governance network theorists argue that the current growth in governance networks can among 
other things be explained by their ability to provide inter-organizational coordination, which is 
essential for the production of efficient and effective public governance under pluricentric 
conditions (Pierre & Peters, 2005; Sørensen & Torfing, 2007: Ch. 1). As argued by Jan Kooiman 
the fragmented and differentiated nature of a pluricentric society (or socio-political system of 
governance as he calls it) produces long cross-organizational lines of interdependency (Kooiman, 
2000: 139) because efforts to solve concrete governance problems in most cases demand for cross-
organizational coordination, cooperation and communication. Governance networks provide an 
institutional framework for enhancing negotiated coordination between such ‘long lines’ of 
interdependent but operationally autonomous actors.  
Studies of governance networks envisage that they can take many forms. Some governance 
networks are loose, inclusive and short lived while others are tight, exclusive and long-lived 
(Rhodes and Marsh, 1992). Some governance networks are ambitious and targets positive 
coordination through the formulation of shared objectives, while others are less ambitious and settle 
for negative coordination i.e. avoiding harming one another (Scharpf, 1994). Finally, governance 
networks also differ with regard to whether they seek to enhance vertical or horizontal coordination. 
Some governance networks seek to provide vertical coordination, cooperation and communication 
by bringing together actors from different levels in the increasingly multi-level political system. 
Others provide horizontal coordination, cooperation and communication between different public 
and private actors at a given level in the political system (Markussen & Torfing, 2007).   
As indicated above, the focus of interest among most governance network theorists have been the 
contributions of governance networks to the efficient and effective production of public 
governance, and the main conclusion seems to be that governance networks adds substantially to 
the efficiency and effectiveness of public governance. While less effort has been done to investigate 
into the possible implications of network governance for democracy there tend to be a general 
agreement that this issue is crucial and needs to be placed high on the research agenda. However, 
the first step in such efforts to study the possible implications of governance networks on 
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democracy, calls for reconsiderations of the traditional liberal notion of democracy and in this 
context its conceptualization of the notions of control and communality. Below, I shall first 
reconsider the concept of democratic control and discuss how participation and deliberation in 
governance networks can contribute to the enhancement of inter-demoi control, and then turn to 
look at the concept of communality and the possible role of governance networks in this respect. 
 
The question of inter-demoi control   
It is about time that we give up the idea that democratic control can be installed as a one-to-one 
relationship between a democratically appointed authority and a People. If it ever did work as 
intended by the protective approach to democracy, which I seriously doubt, this one-stringed 
control mechanism has become insufficient to ensure control in the complex, fragmented, dynamic 
and patchwork like societies of our time. The image of democratic control as a one-to-one 
relationship between a People and an elected body of representatives must be given up and 
exchanged with an image of democratic control as something that must be installed between a 
plurality of temporarily organized groups of affected individuals and a multiplicity of more or less 
autonomous functionally and territorially authorized decision makers. This reinterpretation of 
democratic control indicates two things: 1) that democratic control should to be institutionalized 
through many supplementary control mechanisms and not only through one, and 2) that the People 
controlling the decision makers should not be seen as a permanent body of citizens within a nation 
state but as a temporary body of affected individuals that overlaps with other temporary bodies. 
With regard to the former, the establishment of a complex plurality of control mechanisms, 
although complex and messy, will promote a tighter and more interactive interaction between 
citizens and decision makers. Regarding the latter, an increased focus on affectedness will serve to 
fine tune the democratic control mechanisms so as to insure that those who are most directly 
affected have access to the most elaborate control mechanisms.  
In recent years, it has become increasingly clear that degrees of affectedness do not necessarily 
follow lines of demarcation between nation state demoi (Dryzek, 1997). Therefore, it is time to 
recognize that effective democratic control mechanisms that grant affected citizens the best possible 
control with the decision makers calls for the construction of temporal and overlapping demoi 
organized around concrete degrees of affectedness. In some instances the nature of the issue at stake 
calls for territorially organized temporal demoi while in others the organizing principle must be 
functional. Hence, a citizen might at a given point in time belong to one demoi with regard to some 
aspects of life, while belonging to another demoi when it comes to other aspects, and the 
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membership of each of these demoi gives access to specifically designed democratic control 
mechanisms.   
As such, the increased focus on affectedness as an organizing principle of democracy and the 
establishment of a plurality of links of control between citizens and decision makers is likely to 
ensure a considerable level of democratic control in a pluricentric society. However, as already 
argued by Charles Montesquieu, and recently rearticulated by Eva Ezioni-Halevy (1993, 2003) 
democratic control institutionalized through traditional forms of representative democracy is not on 
its own enough to ensure the citizens an effective democratic control with elected elites since power 
between citizens and elites tend to become much to asymmetrical. Accordingly, effective systems 
of democratic control call for a separation of powers between elected political elites that reduce 
their respective powers and promote a situation in which elites control elites. This way of 
controlling political elites have by some called horizontal accountability that by supplementing 
more vertical forms of accountability contributes to insuring a democratic control with decision 
makers. As argued by Guillermo O’Donnell (1999: 169) ‘accountability runs not only vertically, 
making elected officials answerable to the ballot box, but also horizontally, across a network of 
relatively autonomous powers’.   
While Montesquieu called for a separation of powers within the confines of the sovereign state, 
Ezioni-Halevy advocates for an extension of its relevance beyond the realm of the nation state. 
Hence, she points to the importance of a high level of ongoing political competition and 
contestation between a plurality of autonomous public and private elites and sub-elites for 
enhancing both horizontal and vertical accountability. While horizontal accountability is ensured 
though the separation of powers between a wide plurality of political elites within and beyond the 
state, the vertical accountability which is partly ensured from below through the ballot box, is 
further strengthened through the presence of an intermediate level of sub-elites placed between 
elected political elites and ordinary citizens that promotes qualified vertical contestation, 
competition and mobility between decision makers and decision takers. Vertical accountability, it 
could be added, is further supplemented from above through the presence of a range of trans-
national political institutions, Courts and NGOs, which contest the actions of the Nation States. 
Seen from this perspective on control as an outcome of separated powers, the development of a 
pluricentric political system in which political power is dispersed to elites and sub-elites in different 
levels and centers of decision making enhances the level of democratic control rather than 
weakening it.      
 16 
However, the activation of a system of vertical and horizontal checks and balances, calls for 
institutionalized arenas in which autonomous political elites and sub-elites can pursue negotiated 
goals. This is exactly where governance networks enter the stage as an important instrument for 
ensuring an ongoing contestation and negotiated cooperation between democratically authorized 
demoi (Esmark, 2002, 2007). The reason why networks fit this task so well is that they, as described 
above, are constituted of operationally autonomous but interdependent actors who decide to 
coordinate their actions in order to reach negotiated goals. As such, governance networks represent 
a central means to promote coordinated action in situations where hierarchy is not an option as is 
often the case under pluricentric conditions. It offers to do so by bringing relatively autonomous but 
mutually interdependent political elites and sub-elites together in a shared effort to reach negotiated 
policy goals through processes of political contestation, negotiation and balancing of powers.               
However, in order to give elites and sub-elites the autonomy they need in order to be able to take 
part in negotiated decision making within governance networks the patterns of democratic control 
and accountability must take a be subtle form. If the represented keep their representatives in too 
tight a string, governance networks will be unable to produce negotiated agreements. Hence, 
democratic control of governance networks must be carried out either ex post through intensive 
public deliberation, evaluation and contestation of the outcomes of governance network or through 
horizontal and vertical forms of accountability exercised through the checks and balances within 
and beyond the governance networks. As such, the next step is to search for ways in which to 
promote forms of participation and deliberation that enhances proactive and horizontal and vertical 
forms of control of governance networks.     
 
The question of inter-demoi communality 
However, governance networks do not only give promise to the promotion of new forms of inter-
demoi control in a pluricentric context. It also provides a much needed arena for inter-communal 
communication. To that end, it is time to realize that the presence of a strong unitary sense of 
communality is not only positive for democracy. It is in fact a two egged sword. While, a strong 
unitary communality enhances democracy by promoting the ability of a group of people to act 
together in order to reach collective goals, it threatens democracy by establishing very sharp and 
extensive patterns of exclusion. In short: communality produces unity, and unity produces 
exclusion.  
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In effect, efforts to promote communality sentiments should be pursued with caution and seek to 
develop what could be called soft edges. By the term ‘soft edges’ I refer to the need to develop 
agonistic sentiments within and between demoi (Connolly, 1996; Mouffe, 1993; Tully, 2000). The 
goal must be to promote an awareness of the fact that the communality that constructs a demos as a 
unity, the image of the common good it pursues, and the notions of what it means to be a good 
citizen it prescribes is nothing more than a contingent outcome of political decisions, and has no 
higher justification than that. This recognition of the contingency of political communities and 
democratic identities is important because it promotes the acceptance of difference as something 
that is to be dealt with within the realm of democratic decision making and not beyond it through 
extensive internal and/or external exclusion. Exclusions are inevitable and are a constituting feature 
of political decision making. We just need to acknowledge their political nature, and ensure that the 
process through which exclusions are decided is democratically regulated. Seen from this 
angle, the big question is to find out how antagonistic sentiments are promoted. The answer to this 
question is twofold: 1) through the shaping of situations in which citizens belong to more than one 
political community, and/or 2) through intensified communication and collaboration between 
holders of different political identities either within a given demos or across demoi, The democratic 
promise of the age of pluricentrism is that it enacts overlapping citizenry. As described by theorists 
such as Michael Sandel (1996): 
politics today is played out in a multiplicity of settings from neighborhoods to nations to the world 
as a whole (…) The civic virtue distinctive to our time is the capacity to negotiate our way among 
sometimes overlapping, sometimes conflicting obligations that claim us, and to live with the tension 
to which multiple loyalties give rise. This capacity is difficult to sustain, for it is easier to live with 
the plurality between persons than within them’. (Sandel, 1996: 350) 
An enforcement of the capacity for what we could denote pluricentric citizenship calls for 
deliberate efforts to upgrade our ability to live with the internal tension of multiple loyalties. 
Governance networks have much to offer in this respect. Hence, they pave the way for a promotion 
of inter-demoi communication between autonomous but partially overlapping, interdependent 
political identities and images of communality. With Mark Granovetter’s old terms networks are 
capable of establishing weak ties of communality between strong ties of unitary communality 
(Granovetter, 1973: 1369), and the same line of argument is characterizes the debate on the ability 
of networks to promote social capital not only through bonding but also through bridging that is 
through the promotion of communication between heterogeneous groups (Putnam, 2000; Hazleton 
& Kennan, 2000). In other words networks can function as a platform for inter-community 
participation and deliberation that promotes the construction of weak images of communality 
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between communities held together by more dense communality sentiments. By doing so 
governance networks paves the way for the construction of a degree of inter-demoi communality 
that makes the democratic interaction between demoi possible, while simultaneously reducing the 
closure of intra-demoi-communality that tends to produce intra-demoi exclusion.  
 
Conclusion 
The emergence of an age of pluricentrism definitely challenges the traditional liberal conceptions 
and institutionalizations of democratic control and communality and the patterns of participation 
and deliberation that were meant to enforce them. Since democracy is no longer merely an intra-
demos phenomenon, we need to re-conceptualize and re-institutionalize patterns of democratic 
participation and deliberation in a way that promotes inter-demoi control and communality. 
Governance networks have a crucial role to play in this respect. Hence, governance networks have 
the potential to institutionalize contestation, negotiation and cooperation between a plurality of 
elites and sub-elites and to establish weak ties of communality between demoi, and thus to maintain 
some level of openness and heterogeneity in the collective points of identification within the 
individual demos.    
However, governance networks are no panacea. In order to serve as a means to enhance democracy 
in the age of pluricentrism they must be democratically anchored in different ways. As I and Jacob 
Torfing suggest elsewhere (2005) governance networks should be democratically anchored by 
means of four anchorage points: 1) through metagovernance carried out by elected political leaders 
within the traditional institutions of representative democracy at different levels in the multi-leveled 
political systems; 2) through different pro-active forms of representation in the various affected 
groups of stakeholders; 3) through public contestation and deliberation in a wider citizenry and vis-
à-vis other networks of elites and sub-elites; and 4) through the presence of a democratic network 
constitution that includes rules and norms for the external and internal inclusion and exclusion of 
network actors and for the handling of conflicts within the network (Young, 2000; Sørensen & 
Torfing, 2005). Next step in the effort to develop governance networks into a democratic form of 
participation and deliberation is to develop criteria for the democratic anchorage of governance 
networks.   
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